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The debate over the influence of labour market flexibility on performance is unlikely to be settled
by additional studies using aggregate data and making cross-country comparisons. While this
approach holds little promise, micro-analysis of workers and firms and increased use of experimental
methods represent a path forward. Steps along this path could help end the current 'lawyer's case'







In the thrilling days of yesteryear, economists believed that the key to economic
performance was macro-economic policy.  Monetarists argued that appropriate monetary policies
were the magic bullet for price stability and curbing the business cycle.  Keynesians favored
fiscal policy: deficits to speed economic recovery and surpluses to reduce inflationary pressures.  
Today, there is a new orthodoxy that makes the deregulation of labour market institutions
and increased employment and wage flexibility in the labour market the keys to economic
success.  International agencies, such as the OECD  and IMF, and many economists blame
unemployment and sluggish economic growth on unions and state regulations of pay and
employment that purportedly reduce market flexibility. They recommend that governments
weaken labour market institutions in favor of market driven solutions.  They call for reductions
in the pay of low wage workers to create additional demand for them and tax breaks for the
highly paid to induce them to work more or harder.  
At the same time, there are substantive and growing objections to the evidentiary base on
which the new orthodoxy rests.  Analysts critical of the claim that deregulating labour markets
and weakening trade unions will cure unemployment and spur economic growth argue that the
models that justify these policies are non-robust and ill-specified, more sawdust than hard wood. 
As the criticisms have mounted, many international organizations have backed away from their
condemnation of labour instutions and now express more nuanced views about the economic
effects of labour market institutions than they did a decade or so earlier.  But others hold firmly
to the view that, to paraphrase former President Clinton,  “it’s the labour institutions, stupid”.
Why, despite over a decade of empirical analysis, have economists failed to reach
consensus on the effect of labour institutions on aggregate economic problems and on the
potential for deregulation to improve outcomes?  Is the problem with data?  Is the problem with2
1This paper deals with the debate over institutions in developed economies. For an
analysis of the debate with regard to the developing countries, see Freeman (1993).
the way economists have examined the data?  How might we advance more rapidly our
knowledge about labour institutions to answer the critical questions?
This paper argues that there are two reasons for inconclusive debate over the claim that
labour institutions impair aggregate performance.
1  The first reason is that many adherents to the
claim hold strong priors that labour markets operate nearly perfectly in the absence of institutions
and let their priors dictate their modeling choices and interpretation of empirical results. The
second reason is that the cross-country aggregate data at issue is weak – too weak to decisively
reject strong prior views or to convince those with weaker priors.  Barring a Great Depression
level collapse of the US or EU economies, I cannot imagine the aggregate evidence being so
clear as to overwhelm strong priors. 
   Progress in economics comes, however, not  from maintaining priors in the face of weak
evidence but from obtaining new evidence and adjusting priors to new knowledge.  To improve
our understanding of how labour institutions operate, and move the debate to more productive
terrain, I propose a two-part research strategy: 1) empirical analyses of firms, workers, unions
and other groups in micro settings that resemble the interactions of institutions in the macro-
economy; and 2) development of more sophisticated priors through artificial agent simulations of
markets where institutions can have positive as well as negative effects on outcomes.  The
combination of micro evidence and of simulations of how institutions operate offers a way
around the inconclusive aggregate data that has made the debate over flexibility and labour
market performance so unsatisfying .  
1. The orthodox view: “It’s labour institutions, stupid.”
The 1994 Jobs Study of the OECD (OECD 1994a, 1994b) brought  to the center of policy3
2 John Martin
3 IMF, 2003, chapter 4, p 129
4 IMF, 2003, chapter 4, p 131
debate the claim that labour institutions were the primary cause of unemployment in advanced
countries.  The Jobs Study listed ten recommendations to reduce unemployment and improve
economic performance in the OECD.  Five of the factors were boiler plate platitudes: good
macro-economic policy; enhanced technological knowledge; elimination of impediments to
creation of enterprises; improved education and training; enhanced product market competition. 
Four recommendations called for labor market deregulation: increased flexibility of working
time; making wage and labour costs more flexible by removing restrictions; reforming
employment security provisions; and reforming unemployment and related benefit systems.  The
last recommendation endorsed active labour market policies – training programs, job-finding
assistance to workers, subsidies to employers to hire long-term unemployed or disabled workers,
and special programs for youths leaving school.
2  Most analysts and policy-makers interpreted
the Jobs Study as blaming the economic problems of advanced Europe on inflexible regulated
labour markets.
Nearly a decade after the Jobs Study, the IMF published an article in its World Economic
Outlook that predicted that unemployment in Europe would fall massively below US levels if
European countries deregulated their labor market and product markets:
“labor reforms could produce output gains of about 5 percent and a fall in the
unemployment rate of about 3 percentage points. … those benefits could be￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ by
simultaneous efforts to increase competition in the product market.”
3
high unemployment is largely structural in nature—and thereby potentially affected by
institutions—rather than cyclical (and therefore determined by the business cycle and
macroeconomic policies). (Enact the reforms and) … unemployment could fall by
about 6 ½ percentage points”
44
5 IMF, 2003, chapter 4, p 129
“when labor markets are more competitive, the economy reacts more quickly and
smoothly to changes in interest rates. This facilitates the task of the monetary authorities;
 in particular, smaller changes in interest rates—and therefore output—are necessary to
stabilize inflation in the face of shocks.”. 
5
The belief that labour institutions impede economic efficiency is not new to the IMF and
other international financial institutions (IFIs).  The Fund published a similar analysis of
European unemployment problems in 1999, albeit without such bold predictions about the huge
reduction in unemployment that “reforms” would generate.  In their effort to help developing
countries deal with balance of payments and fiscal deficit problems, both the Fund and the World
Bank have long feared that labour institutions will undermine the macro-economic stabilization
policies and structural adjustment programs they recommend.  In a balance of payments crisis, a
country must shift resources from non-traded goods to traded goods.  This usually requires a
currency devaluation, which lowers the real wage.  Since traded goods sectors tend to be capital
intensive, moreover, the reallocation of resources is also likely to increase returns to capital
relative to the returns to labor.  Similarly, in a fiscal crisis, governments must raise taxes and/or
reduce public spending, which lowers real wages and redistributes income from the poor to the
wealthy.  Since the recommended policies harm labour, at least in the short run, the IFIs naturally
worry that unions and other labour institutions, which seek to protect the economic well-being of
workers, will oppose the policies.  The IFIs view labor insitutions as potential “flies in the
ointment” of the adjustments needed to restore economic health to sick economies.
This perspective has led  IMF-associated economists to stress the dangers of insufficient
labour market flexibility in economic crises even when those crises arise from problems far
removed from the labour market.  Commenting on the 2002 economic collapse of the Fund’s5
6 Mussa, 2002, p. 9 The italics are mine.
7 Anne Krueger, 2002, The italics are mine.
once poster economy, Argentina, Michael Mussa, former chief economist at the IMF  wrote:
 “ If Argentina had a more flexible economic system, especially in its labor markets, its economy
would have been more able to adapt to the rigors of the convertibility plan, unemployment would
have been lower, growth would have been stronger, fiscal deficits would have been smaller, and
interest rates would have been lower
6” 
At an NBER conference, Anne Krueger, then first deputy managing director, expressed a
 similar view, blaming Argentina’s problems on  
“... two factors ... weak fiscal policy and mounting overvaluation, the latter reflecting
relatively high inflation, a stronger dollar, and insufficient domestic flexibility (for example, in
the labor market). The last point is especially important — under a firmly fixed exchange, you
need other sources of adjustment to maintain competitiveness.”
7  
While neither IMF expert called for Argentina to weaken its unions, lower minimum
wages, lessen employment protection laws, cut unemployment benefits, etc., those are the
orthodox ways to make labor markets more flexible.  
2.  The other side: Innocent till Proven Guilty:
On the other side are economists and international agencies who see labour market
institutions as a way of enhancing economic adjustments and avoiding macro crises.  The Nordic
(Rehn-Meidner) Model of the open macro-economy posits that peak level unions and employers’
associations negotiate changes in wages that are roughly equal to productivity growth in traded
goods sectors and changes in world prices, so as to maintain fixed exchange rates (Aukrust;
Henry Milner and Eskil Wadensjö).  The assumption is that national bargainers take account of
macro-economic facts, while local labour markets would produce inflationary wage changes in
periods of full employment.  Reflecting a similar perspective, Mancur Olson has argued that
centralized collective bargaining in small open Nordic economies works because all-6
8  This is what one would expect in an ideal competitive economy, where industry shocks
alter employment but not wages.  See Council of Economic Advisors, 1962 and Salter, for classic
statements of this principle.
encompassing “peak” union organizations internalize the negative externalities that arise in
wage-bargaining at the firm or industry level.  In fact, there is evidence that industry labour
markets in Nordic countries operate closer to the competitive ideal than industry labour markets
in the market-driven US.  In the US changes in sectoral prices and productivity affect sectoral
wages, contrary to the standard model of competitive wage setting
8 whereas in the Nordic
countries institutionally determined wages assure that changes in sectoral prices and productivity
have little impact on sectoral wages (Holmlund and Zetterberg, 1991). 
The international agency responsible for labour issues, the ILO, also
“takes issue with the view that labour market rigidity has been the major cause of
unemployment and that greater labour market flexibility is the solution ... jobless rates
appear to have risen independently of levels of labour market regulations ...trade union
power was reduced in many countries, together with unemployment benefits and in some
cases minimum wages, producing little if any positive employment effect.” 
(www.jobsletter.org.nz/jbl05210.htm).   
The ILO argues to the contrary – that economic systems based on labor-management
discussions can improve aggregate efficiency: “Successful social dialogue structures and
processes have the potential to resolve important economic and social issues, encourage good
governance, advance social and industrial peace and stability and boost economic progress.”  The
ILO does not root its positive attitude toward social dialogue in neo-classical economics, but the
notion that negotiations can lead to efficient outcomes is consistent with Ronald Coase’s analysis
of  transactions costs.  The Coase theorem holds that regardless of the distribution of property
rights, bargaining should produce an optimal allocation of resources as long as transactions costs
are low.  Labour institutions could redistribute income toward workers without harming
economic efficiency.7
In the 1980s and early 1990s the World Bank looked askance at labour institutions:
“Labor market policies – minimum wages, job security regulations, and social security – are
usually intended to raise welfare or reduce exploitation.  But they actually work to raise the cost
of labor in the formal sector and reduce labor demand ... and thus (depress) labor incomes where
most of the poor are found.” (World Bank, 1990b, p 63).  But in its 1995 World Development
Report the Bank gave a more balanced view. It wrote about “how should governments intervene
in labor markets”, (WDR, 1995, p 69) not why governments should not intervene.  The WDR
noted that “It is possible to identify the conditions and policies under which free trade unions can
advance rather than impede development” (WDR, 1995, p 86 ). By 2003 the Bank had deviated
even furthur from its traditional perspective.  It released the book Unions and Collective
Bargaining: Economic Effects in a Global Environment under the headline “Economies Perform
Better In Coordinated Labor Markets”.   This volume reported that “Workers who belong to trade
unions earn higher wages, work fewer hours, receive more training, and  have longer job tenure
on average, than their non-unionized counterparts ....  On the other hand, temporary layoffs can
be more frequent in unionized firms. At the macroeconomic level, high unionization rates lead to
lower inequality of earnings and can improve economic performance (in the form of lower
unemployment and inflation, higher productivity and speedier adjustment to shocks)” (World
Bank Group, 2003).
The InterAmerican Development Bank has a similar view.  In 2003 it explicitly rejected
the deregulation solution and called for institutions to help markets work better:  “Labor
regulations are not cost-free, but deregulation is not the answer....  Unions are neither the sand in
the wheels of the labor market nor the solution to low wages....  better labor market performance
is compatible with lower earnings inequality ...  The new agenda requires a strengthened labor8
authority and a complex network of public and private institutions” (InterAmerican Development
Bank, 2003 pp 7-8). 
In short, while the position that labor market institutions are a major cause of
unemployment and related aggregate economic problems has considerable adherents, there is a
substantial and growing number of economists and international agencies who take exception to
that view.
3.  What the Data Shows
The natural way to resolve the debate about how labour institutions affect economies is to
examine data on economic outcomes in the presence and absence of the institutions.  At this
writing, there have been dozens of studies that compare aggregate outcomes between countries
with or without various institutions and in the same country before and after it changes an
institutional arrangement. 
The OECD has been a a major contributor to the research.  Its 1994 Jobs Study report was
accompanied by two volumes of supporting research and was followed by numerous studies and
reviews of studies, many given in the OECD’s annual Employment Outlook.  The OECD has
provided new and valuable measures of employment protection legislation and of replacement
rates in unemployment benefit systems and measures of product market institutions as well as of
labour market institutions.  In addition, Steve Nickell (1997), with various co-authors, and
Layard, Nickell, and  Jackman (1994) have contributed significantly to the case that labour
markets are the root cause of Europe’s unemployment. Reading these studies, most of which
confidently proclaim that the data prove that institutions are indeed the problem, one could
readily end up believing that there was overwhelming scientific support that  European labour
institutions are guilty as charged of having caused joblessness and slow economic growth.  9
9 Nickell and Bell, 1996 show that EU-US employment gaps are as large among skilled as
among less skilled workers.  Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1994) and Freeman and Schettkat,
(2001) find little relation between employment and labor costs of workers by industry or
occupation across countries.  Increased hours worked in the US among the educated and women,
whose wages rose relative to the US average, also runs counter to the rigidity story (Freeman,
1995). Evidence that changes in the US minimum had negligible employment effects imply that
low wages did not cause high employment (Card and Krueger 1997)
But these analyses are akin to a prosecutor’s case in a trial.  They give the evidence that
suggests the institutions are guilty but do not reflect on the weaknesses of that evidence.  To
reach a verdict, it is necessary as well to see the arguments by analysts who take the other side of
the debate – the defense attorneys, as it were. These researchers give a different reading of what
the data shows and, most important, of the robustness of the case against labor institutions.
9  In a
volume devoted to debunking the Jobs Study claims, Baker, Glyn, Howell, and Schmidt (2004)
document that the findings in several time series models that find that institutions adversely
affect aggregate outcomes are not robust.  The estimated coefficients on labour institutions
disappear or becomes statistically insignificant when the researchers make modest changes in the
measures of instititutions, countries covered, and time periods of analysis. Models that cover
more years, countries, and measures than earlier studies “provide little support for those who
advocate comprehensive deregulation of OECD labor markets” (p 106).  Baker et al conclude
that there is a “yawning gap between the confidence with which the case for labor market
deregulation has been asserted and the evidence that the regulating institutions are the culprits”
(p 198).  Blanchflower (2001) tells a similar story, noting “only a weak positive relation in the
OECD between unemployment and benefits (p 390) and “no support (from a 1999 OECD report) 
... for the belief that unions, benefits, the tax wedge, ALMP spending or earnings dispersion
influence unemployment ... contrary to the claims made in Layard et al, which appear to be based
on misspecified cross-country unemployment regressions (p 392)”.  10
Why are supporters of the new orthodoxy so convinced that their analysis definitively
convicts labour institutions while critics find inconclusive results in the same data?   
 Blanchard and Wolfers suggest that one reason is a form of regression-mongering, in
which the models used to make the case against institutions “are in part the result of economic
Darwinism … measures … constructed ex post facto by researchers who were not unaware of
unemployment  developments” (Blanchard and Wolfer, 2002, p 18).   As an example of this form
of analysis, Blanchflower notes that some models include country dummy variables that
effectively remove observations that fail to fit the orthodox model.  If Spain (or Ireland, or any
country) had drastically a different employment experience than measures of labour institutions
suggest they should have, analysts with strong priors can invariably find enough idiosyncracies
about that country to convince themselves that its observations should be treated differently than
those of other countries.
In sum, both sides of the debate over institutions have operated as lawyers in a trial,
driven by a strong commitment to their client (priors).  Adherents to the new orthodox view
search the data for specifications/measures that support their priors,  while barely noticing
evidence that goes against them.  If results are inconsistent with the priors, they assume that
something is wrong with their empirical specification or measures, rather than question the
validity of their case.  If results fit their priors, they rarely look further to find weaknesses.  On
the other side, critics of the case that labor institutions are the root cause of economic problems
act as defense attorneys. They see their job as finding specifications and measures that make the
institutions innocent of the alleged crime of causing unemployment or other economic problems.  
To the extent that the burden of proof is on the prosecutor, the defense team has an easier job. 
They do not have to come up with another suspect, which is hard, but have only to demonstrate11
10The evolving views of the OECD can be seen in various Employment Outlooks (1995,
1996, 1997, 1999).
11 This is true for advanced countries.  The situation is more ambiguous in developing
countries since unions do not represent workers in the informal sector and rarely represent rural
workers, who are paid less than those in the modern sector.
that the data are more ambiguous than the prosecutor claims.  
At this writing, the critics of the new orthodoxy have done this with sufficient success to 
impel even the OECD to retreat from its strong Jobs Study claim to a more equivocal position
about the impact of institutions on outcomes.
10  The 2004 OECD Employment Outlook admitted
that “the evidence of the role played by EPL (employment protection legislation) on aggregate
employment and unemployment rates remains mixed” (p 81); and expressed concern that the
temporary contracts that replaced permanent jobs in some countries (such as Spain) produced 
labour market duality between those with permanent contracts and those with temporary
contracts and job insecurity that were themselves a problem.  The Outlook argued for “the
plausibility of the Jobs Strategy diagnosis that excessively high aggregate wages and/or wage
compression have been impediments” to jobs, while admitting that “this evidence is somewhat
fragile”.  With respect to unionism, it accepted that the effect of collective bargaining “appears to
be contingent upon other institutional and policy factors that need to be clarified to provide
robust policy advice” (p. 165).  
While proponents and opponents of the case against labour institutions disagree about the
whether labour institutions are a significant contributor to unemployment and aggregate
economic efficiency, it is important to recognize that they concur on one point: that labour
institutions, particularly those associated with trade unions, reduce inequality of pay compared to
pay in competitive markets.
11  The evidence here is overwhelming.  In countries like the US
which decentralized labor markets set pay, dispersion of earnings is lower in unionized12
12Erickson and Ichino, 1995; Manacorda, 2004
13 Patterns in strikes run counter to a Coase theorem interpretation.  If management and
workers lose from strikes, they should come to an agreement without strikes or lockouts. 
workplaces than in nonunion workplaces; dispersion of pay falls for the same workers when they
move from nonunion to union settings, and increases when they move in the opposite direction.
Across countries, dispersion of pay tends to be lower in countries with high rates of collective
bargaining coverage than in countries with low rates of collective bargaining.  Over time,
moreover, dispersion decreases in countries when institutions play a greater role in pay setting
and increases when institutional pay setting gets weaker.  For example, when Italy used the Scala
Mobile to set pay, inequality fell rapidly whereas when it scrapped that form of national pay
bargaining, inequality began to rise.
12
In short, priors aside, the best summary of the data – what we really know – is that labour
institutions reduce earnings inequality but that they have no clear relation to other aggregate
outcomes, such as unemployment.  From the perspective of the evidence, the claim that “it’s
labour institutions, stupid”  is an interpretation, perhaps right, perhaps wrong, of the link between 
institutions and aggregate economic problems.  That institutions affect distribution but do not
affect aggregate efficiency is consistent with a Coase-theorem interpretation of how institutions
operate, though it is far from conclusive.
13
4. The Role of Strong Priors in the Case Against Labor Institutions
Despite the lack of robust evidence, many economists and policy-makers continue to
strongly defend the orthodox view that institutions are the root cause of economic problems.  In
the January 2005 Economic Journal Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel reitorated the claim that “the
broad movements in unemployment in the OECD can be explained by shifts in labour market
institutions” (p 1) ... without responding to the evidence given by critics of that view.   And the13
14  The Spring 2004 German IFO institute economics magazine CESifo Forum was
devoted to European labour markets. Many economists favoured some aspects of the orthodox
view while one (me) argued that European labour markets were not “as bad as all that” (Freeman,
2004) .  My argument was that no real world market looks good when compared to the ideal
competitive market, but that such a comparison was misleading since no real world market
performs in accord with the competitive ideal; and that it was this comparison of European
labour markets with the ideal that led many analysts astray.
IMF published the analysis cited earlier (IMF, 2003) and which I will consider in depth shortly –
also without responding to critical commentary about the robustness of results.  
What explains strong adherence to a claim whose empirical support is “fragile”, “mixed”,
“contingent on factors that need to be clarified”, and so on? 
The best interpretation I can give is that these economists come to the problem of
explaining unemployment with the prior that markets work well absent interventions, and thus
that the right place to look for causes of problems is at institutions that may impede the operation
of the markets.
14   They have fairly tight bands around this  prior, so that it  dominates weak
evidence, and thus produces posteriors close to the priors, as in standard Bayesian inference. 
The April 2003 article in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook quoted earlier provides an
example of such prior-driven analysis.  As noted, this article predicted that “reforms” that would
make European labour markets more like those in the US would reduce EU unemployment from
8.0% to 5.0% and raise GDP by 5 percent, while a combination of labour and  product market
reforms would reduce EU unemployment by 6.5 points to 1.5%!  
Analysts with weaker priors might have noticed that the magnitude of these effects border
on the impossible.  In 2003 many EU countries had unemployment rates below 6.5%  -- Austria,
Denmark, Eire, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (as well
as Norway outside the EU), so the 6.5 point drop would put them into negative unemployment
terrain.  Since this cannot occur, rates would have to fall by more than 6.5 points in other14
15 IMF, April 2003, figure 4.4, p 134. 
countries.  Analysts with weaker priors might have noticed that the country with nominally the
most flexible institutions, the US, did not have anything close to the predicted 1.5% rate of
unemployment.  In 2003 the US unemployment rate was 6.0%.  That the EU would have one-
fourth the unemployment rate that the US had if the EU only had flexible US institutions seems
prima facie nonsense.  If the US couldn’t attain a 1.5% unemployment rate with these flexible
institutions or even the 5.0% unemployment rate predicted for European countries if they adopted
US style labour practices, why should European countries do so well?
The excessive claim does not come from erroneous empirical work.  The most rigorous
analysis in the article shows nothing like these effects.  This analysis estimates a vector of
“Institution-Adjusted Unemployment Rates” for OECD countries – unemployment rates minus
the estimated impact of  institutions on unemployment.  Graphs in the article show that these
rates closely track actual changes in unemployment rates, and the article informs the reader that
this means  that  “Institutions …hardly account for the growing trend observed in most European
countries and the dramatic fall in U.S. unemployment in the 1990s” (my italics).
15   In particular,
the article stressed that Germany had broadly unchanged institutions while unemployment rose
by about 6 percentage points.  No change in institutions and higher unemployment – just the sort
of conclusion one might have expected from one of the critics of the orthodox position.  But,
despite this finding, the article’s message was that weakening  institutions would reduce
unemployment to 1.5%.  How could they reach such a conclusion from such data?
 The analysts tell us: by ignoring the longitudinal evidence (which most empiricists would
regard as providing a stronger and more valid test of any claim) in favor of cross section
regressions that showed that institutions “... alone explain a good deal of the cross-country 15
16 Charles Ragin (1987) has done the most to analyze the problem of inferring relations
from configurations. 
17 If we used a high/medium/low categorization, we would have 81  (= 3
4) possible
configurations. 
differences in unemployment rates”.   In the context of US-EU differences, this is a nearly
circular argument: the US has different institutions and lower unemployment than Europe, so
those institutions must explain the difference in unemployment.  That the cross section analysis
predicted that Europe’s rate of unemployment would fall by incredible amounts to 1/4th the US’s
rate of unemployment should have been a red flag that even here something was amiss – be it
misspecification, omitted variable bias, what have you, of the sort that longitudinal analyses are
designed to reduce, if not eliminate.  But the strong prior that European unemployment was due
to labour institutions overwhelmed the empirics and interpretation thereof.  The prosecuting
attorney was committed to argue for conviction no matter what.
5. Configurations and evidence
Priors aside, the problem of determining how institutions affect outcomes is difficult. 
 One difficulty is the large number of possible configurations of institutions relative to the
number of cross-country observations on which to assess their impact on outcomes.
16   By
configurations I mean combinations of  institutional arrangements, such as union density,
collective bargaining coverage, centralization of bargaining, employment protection laws,
government regulation of wages, affirmative action policies, etc.  Consider the problem of
analysing 4 institutions, all coded as 0/1 so that a country has/does not have a given institution,
and with institutions measured so that having one implies less reliance on decentralized markets. 
In an experimental design to assess the impact of institutions,  we would look at the outcomes
associated with the 32 (= 2
4) logically possible configurations of institutions.
17  The orthodox16
18 The highly correlated outcomes implies that having higher frequency data cannot
resolve the problem – you don’t learn any more by having monthly unemployment rates than
from yearly unemployment rates.  In developing countries, the Easterly,  Kremer, Pritchett, and 
Summers’ finding that growth rates are not highly correlated creates a different problem in
assessing how institutions or policies affect outcomes.
hypothesis would be that the configuration with four 0s would give the best outcome – the lowest
unemployment rate.  The alternative hypothesis that centralized bargaining works best would be
that the configuration with four 1' s would give the best outcome.  In between are a diverse set of
possibilities. 
The social world does not provide the evidence needed to assess all of the possibilities. 
Invariably there are no observations on some configurations, some of which may be impossible
to fit together, but others of which may be unobservable for some less compelling reason – such
as historical circumstance.  There will also be some combinations for which the observation is a
single country, which makes it indistinguishable from anything else unique about that country,
and thus possibly meaningless for assessing how the combination might work in some other
country.  With only 30 or so advanced countries, highly correlated outcomes, and infrequent
changes in  institutions, the number of configurations can easily exceed the number of
independent data points.
18 
To deal with the problem of excessive configurations, analysts of labour institutions have
aggregated arrangements into simpler categories: “neo-corporatist” economies vs “liberal”
economies, and so on.  But there is no uniform agreement about these groupings.  For example,
Japan combines company level unionism and profits related bonuses with a strong employer
federation, the Shunto offensive, and a sense of national unity.  Is this neo-corporatist or liberal,
or does Japan merit its own categorization?  As long as countries have many institutions that
differ in many ways, researchers risk forming classifications or groupings that support their17
priors rather than that test those views. 
Another difficulty in analysing how institutions affect outcomes is that unlike Gertrude
Stein’s “ a rose is a rose is a rose”, institutions change over time as their members and leaders
learn from experience.  Unions, government regulators, and employer federations do not respond
in the same way to the same stimula regardless of past events any more than does any other
economic agent.  As cases in point, consider the way the British and German unions behaved in
the 1970s to the way they acted  in the 1990s.  In the seventies, the British unions were
troglodytes, opposed to seemingly rational economic thought and responsibility toward the UK
economy.  German unions were widely praised as responsible economic agents.  In the 1990s the
British unions  were the modernizers, with the TUC endorsing “value added” unionism on the
notion that only if unions could add value to the performance of firms would they be able to
improve the well-being of workers.  By contrast, the German unions seemed incapable of
adjusting to the economic realities of post-unification Germany and globalization.  Recognizing
that unions learn from the past, one would not want to assume that unions would respond to
some future inflationary shock as they did to the 1970s inflation.
6.  Doing better
If excessively strong priors, configurations too numerous or complex for aggregate data,
and changes in institutional behaviour limit our ability to bring the debate about how labour
markets affect aggregate outcomes to closure, what can we do to increase our understanding of
those institutions?
My proposed strategy has two parts.  First, to supplement  priors based on perfect markets
with priors based on experimental economics lab findings and artificial agent simulations of
markets which allow institutions to have positive as well as negative effects on outcomes. 18
19 Economists, like the general public, also derive priors from “anecdotal evidence” – ie
the events that we personally  experience or observe others experiencing. 
Second, to examine data on how firms, workers, unions and other groups operate in micro
settings that resemble the macro-economic institutional settings. 
developing more realistic priors
The prior that labor markets work perfectly absent institutional interventions comes from
standard models of how rational optimizing agents interact in competitive markets.
19 Although
economics has theories that deal with other markets – monopsony theory being perhaps the most
prominent in labour analysis (Manning, 2005) – most economists downplay their importance and
hold the prior that markets operate according to the competitive model unless proven otherwise. 
As a first approximation, this seems sensible, but once empirical evidence shows that the perfect
market model is incomplete, it is necessary to do more than search for impediments to perfection. 
Analyzing the markets which most closely fit the theoretic ideal, financial markets, economists
have found it necessary to go beyond the first approximation “efficient market model”.  Indeed,
the anomolies in financial markets, which can generate huge economic problems, have spawned
an entire field, behavioral finance. While it is always dangerous to argue by analogy, I am willing
to make such an argument here.  If it’s necessary to develop more realistic priors about behavior
in finance, where all that matters is money, then surely it’s necessary to do so in labor, where
market participants are concerned with much more than monetary considerations.
   To develop more realistic priors about how people and institutions operate in aggregate
economies, we can make greater use of two modes of analysis.  The first mode are laboratory
experiments, which provide insight into individual behavior and the way individuals connect in
markets.  Experimental economics (see Kagel and Roth, 1995) has generated findings about
behaviour in diverse situations – the ultimatum game, the dictator game, the prisoners dilemma19
game, and public goods games, that have implications for labour institutions.  Experimental
economics has also generated findings about the conditions under which supply and demand
clear markets, and the conditions under which they do not.  While the jump from laboratory
experiments to actual institutions is a large one, knowledge of what experimental economics has
found should help us form better priors about what to expect from labour institutions.
The second tool are simulations based on artificial agent modeling.  This form of
modeling can help us develop priors about the interaction among decision units.  The Sante Fe
Stock market model (Le Baron, 2002), for example, shows how competing strategies adopted by
agents with bounded rationality can interact to produce swings in stock market values that more
resemble the actual swings  than the random fluctuations in any efficient market model.  Models
of labour economic institutions have focused on issues relating to the matching of firms and
workers (Neugart, 2004; Pingle and Tesfatsion, 2003) but they could not also examine other
institutions or issues – for instance the high dispersion of wages in labour markets.  Al Roth and
co-workers (1999, 2000) have shown the value of combining modeling with the design of new
institutional forms for specific labor markets.  These models provide powerful priors for what to
expect from actual institutions or changes in institutions.
Using micro data
Priors help interpret evidence, but ultimately it is evidence that ends scientific debate. If
you accept my claim that the aggregate evidence is unlikely to be definitive in bringing closure to
the labour institution debate, then we should look for more micro evidence.  Studies of firms,
whose organization is sufficiently complicated to provide insight into interactions of institutions
at a higher level, would seem to offer the most promising area for research.  There are lots of
firms and lots of changes in labor practices among them, so there is no lack of data.  To judge20
whether formal labour market rules produce worse employment outcomes, as claimed by
orthodox analysts, one could contrast employment between firms with more or less rigid internal
rules. When Martin Weitzman (1984) hypothesized that profit-sharing could reduce
unemployment and maintain low inflation by creating a permanent excess labor demand, labour
economists analyzed the employment pattern of firms with and without profit-sharing (Kruse,
1993) and found that the data was generally supportive of the hypotheses.  While there are
problems with generalizing from micro analysis to the aggregate economy, there is still much we
can learn about how labour institutions operate from micro data.  Indeed, the most convincing
evidence that some regulations affect unemployment adversely comes from micro studies that
show that longer durations of unemployment benefits generate longer spells of unemployment.
These estimates are much smaller than those obtained in some cross-country regressions, but they
are robust and driven by the data rather than strong priors and particular model specifications. 
More can be learned from narrower investigations of hypotheses than from the sweeping claims
based on weak aggregative data.
Conclusion
 I draw three lessons from the debate over the link between labour instititutions and
aggregate outcomes. 
First, that the debate cannot be resolved by analysis of the aggregate data in question. The
data do not scream out loudly and clearly “it’s labour institutions, stupid,” as the new orthodoxy
initially claimed, nor does the data say “that’s impossible”.   Rather, the data mumble omething 
akin to “I don’t know ... don’t ask me ...  maybe ...  your guess is as good as mine.”  
Second, that researchers should beware the power of priors, particularly their own, in
analysing weak aggregate data.  Strong priors can be blinders to knowledge, and can lead to21
excessive “lawyers’ case” empirical analysis, which will eventually be rebutted.  
Third, there is a road to improved knowledge.  It is through developing more
sophisticated priors about how people behave in institutional settings and how institutions
interact in markets on the one side; and through analysis of the response of workers and firms to
particular institutional settings in micro settings.  It is not by continued regression mongering of
weak cross country data . 22
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